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abstract: This paper argues that, although Nietzsche’s rejection of free will 
leaves no room for a morally substantial, compatibilist conception of freedom of 
agency, freedom nevertheless plays an important role in his positive moral phi-
losophy, since Nietzsche’s higher human types are characterized by a heightened 
feeling of freedom—a qualitative affect without deeper substance. Moreover, 
because the feeling of freedom is increased by resistance, it requires a limitation 
of practical freedom—a relative constraint of ability, strength, and activity rather 
than their absolute promotion. Nietzsche’s higher types are, if anything, less 
free than others. Consequently, his criterion for human enhancement cannot be 
that of quantitatively greater freedom, power, or agency. Rather, it is measured 
according to the intensity of an individual’s feelings of freedom, of agency and 
power, and of the love of fate that this illusory feeling of freedom promotes.
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Despite his rejection of the metaphysical conception of freedom of the will, Nietzsche frequently makes positive use of the language of freedom, auton-
omy, self-mastery, self-overcoming, and creativity when describing his norma-
tive project of enhancing humanity through the promotion of its highest types. 
A number of interpreters have been misled by such language to conclude that 
Nietzsche accepts some version of compatibilism, holding a theory of natural 
causality that excludes metaphysical or “libertarian” freedom of the will, while 
endorsing morally substantial alternative conceptions of freedom, autonomy, 
and responsibility.
I argue to the contrary that although Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysical 
freedom of the will does not leave room for a morally substantial compatibilist 
conception of freedom, the phenomenology of freedom and agency nonetheless 
plays a crucial role in his positive moral project. Nietzsche’s normative ideal 
of a higher, more valuable human type consists of the only kind of agency he 
believes to be possible: the mere feeling of freedom—the qualitative feeling 
alone, without deeper substance. Not only does the feeling of agency not imply 
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any strong, morally significant freedom of agency, in practice it requires a 
limitation of practical freedom—the constraint of ability, strength, and activ-
ity rather than their promotion. Nietzsche’s ideal higher types are, if anything, 
less free than others. Consequently, the criterion by which Nietzsche measures 
human “enhancement” (Erhöhung)1 cannot be that of greater freedom or more 
authentic agency. Instead, Nietzsche’s alternative ideal is measured qualita-
tively and subjectively, by feeling—specifically, by an individual’s love of her 
self as a product of fate, her well-disposedness to existence as such—and not 
quantitatively and objectively, by fact—by greater agency, strength, or ability.
Once we have recognized that Nietzsche rejects any morally significant 
conception of freedom, yet still endorses as part of his normative ideal the 
enhancement of the mere feeling of freedom, we can resolve a central puzzle in 
Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, which wavers between two distinct ideals. On 
one hand, there is Nietzsche’s quantitative, naturalistic ideal of animal health: 
a strong hierarchy of drives conducive to strong will, efficient action, and the 
expansion of strength, growth, and power—in contrast to the condition of deca-
dence, an anarchy of drives that exhaust and weaken the subject. On the other 
hand, there is Nietzsche’s celebration of a type that is “as manifold as whole 
[ebenso vielfach als ganz],” characterized by a qualitative tension of the soul 
due to a diversity of drives in relations of resistance to one another—an ideal 
with surprising similarities to the decadent type that Nietzsche disparages, and 
likely, due to its internal tensions, to be relatively weaker and less free in some 
respects than those who exhibit a less complex and more homogenous hierarchy 
of the drives (BGE 212).2
If, as I argue, Nietzsche’s ideal is not the real increase of freedom, but merely 
the enhancement of the feeling of freedom, then his preference for the ideal of 
the manifold soul is consistent, while the promotion of animal health as the 
integration of the drives—as a condition of the manifold type—is clarified. 
Animal health, a strong hierarchy of drives calibrated to the conditions of life and 
existence, is not a normative end in itself, but rather is the basis for a distinctly 
human form of higher existence: the qualitatively heightened or intensified feel-
ing of freedom experienced not by any real increase of freedom, but through the 
intensification of the feeling of power experienced in resistance.
An Incompatibilist Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Argument 
Against “Unfree Will”
My position is twofold: (1) Nietzsche is a determinist incompatibilist about 
freedom, but (2) the concept of freedom nevertheless plays a crucial role in the 
articulation of his ideal of higher types—although only in the form of the feeling 
of freedom, not its reality.3 When I call Nietzsche an incompatibilist, I mean 
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that his fatalistic view of human nature leaves no room for a morally substantial 
concept of freedom. We might, as Nietzsche himself often does, choose to call 
his account of agency a conception of “freedom,” but the important question 
is whether this notion of freedom has significant consequences for his moral 
philosophy. For example, if Nietzsche measures human enhancement accord-
ing to greater degrees of freedom, then freedom would be a morally substantial 
concept, since a normative evaluation would then depend on the meaningfulness 
of the distinction between free and unfree, or more and less free.
My view that Nietzsche lacks any such morally substantial concept of freedom 
includes the rejection of compatibilist interpretations of the many freedom-
connoting concepts that Nietzsche uses, such as autonomy, self-mastery, self-
creation, and responsibility. However, my focus is on the concept of agency, 
since that is the basis of the form of freedom most often attributed to Nietzsche. 
Ken Gemes, for example, has argued that Nietzsche rejects only “deserts free 
will,” which concerns “whether determinism precludes free will” and “whether 
having done such and such one could have done otherwise,” but accepts “agency 
free will,” which concerns the question “what constitutes an action as opposed 
to a mere doing?”4 If Nietzsche accepts agency free will, then he believes that 
some individuals are freer than others, because they are truly agents rather than 
mere doers. They are properly considered the cause of their character and actions, 
because their character and actions are the products of a strong, integrated self 
that has been individually attained through acts of self-determination. As Gemes 
describes it, “Unity, soul, personhood are not pre-given existences but rare 
achievements to be gained by hard effort.”5
The evidence for the compatibilist reading generally and the freedom of 
agency reading specifically is quite slim. It relies primarily on Nietzsche’s use 
of freedom-connoting language, rather than any direct assertion or defense by 
Nietzsche of a morally substantial, alternative concept of freedom. His most 
direct endorsement of compatibilism is not direct at all: a critique of the language 
of determinism, a critique of the notion of unfreedom rather than an endorsement 
of a strong alternative conception.
In Beyond Good and Evil, after rejecting the concept of free will, Nietzsche 
then asks that we also reject “unfree will” since, as he claims, cause and effect are 
merely “conventional fictions for the purpose of description and communication, 
not explanation” (BGE 21). Consequently, the relation of cause to effect that we 
interpret as a constraint incompatible with freedom does not really exist: “in the 
‘in-itself’ there is nothing like ‘causal connection’ [Verbänden], ‘necessity,’ or 
‘psychological unfreedom.’ There, the ‘effect’ does not follow ‘from the cause,’ 
there no ‘law’ governs [regiert kein ‘Gesetz’]” (BGE 21).
The language of cause and effect invites us to imagine causality as the coer-
cion of one individual or causal agent by another, in which one agency as cause 
imposes a change on another as effect, so that every causal event entails the 
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“unfreedom” of the affected individual or substance. The individual that is 
 causally affected is “unfree” in the sense that it undergoes an externally imposed 
change. If, on the contrary, we follow Nietzsche’s advice and do not take the 
language of cause and effect literally, we may then doubt whether causal process 
are really relations of compulsion, imposition, or force between individuals—
whether causal relations are relations of externally imposed changes.
Some interpreters of Nietzsche argue that this passage supports a compatibilist 
reading of his view of freedom.6 However, his claim that there are no causal con-
nections is not a denial of strong determinism or necessity since, as he suggests 
in the very next passage, one might argue that the world “follows a ‘necessary’ 
and ‘calculable’ course, although not because laws govern it, but rather because 
laws are absolutely lacking, and every power draws its final consequences at 
every moment” (BGE 22). The implied argument seems to be that in the absence 
of any causal laws whatsoever, there is no possible origin of contingent events. 
If every power draws its final consequences at every moment, without the pos-
sibility of the constraint of its power by an overruling causal law, then there is 
only one possible way in which its power can and will be manifested.
The resulting view is very strange, indeed: there may be something like “causal 
necessity,” but no causal “laws” and no real “causes” and “effects.” Necessity, 
on this view, originates internally rather than in external relations. Each power 
can do nothing but draw its final consequences—presumably, this means it can 
do nothing but act in whatever way and to whatever degree its circumstances 
allow it most fully to manifest its power—which produces its relation to other 
powers rather than being determined (made “unfree”) by them. And since every 
other power can also do nothing but draw its final consequences at any moment, 
there is no sense in which one power has causal priority over the other, no sense 
in which one can be counted as “the cause” and another as “the effect.” To be 
sure, this is an obscure and perhaps implausible position, but the compatibilist 
must admit that Nietzsche clearly prefers it to the more commonsense causal 
picture that he has dismissed as a misleading “conventional fiction.”
Of course, he also admits that this view may be “only interpretation.” This 
might be evidence of an inconsistent regression to Kantian dualism: real cau-
sality is unknowable, so metaphysical freedom remains a possibility. But it is 
also compatible with his later, resolutely anti-metaphysical position. If, as he 
declares in TI, “with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world” 
(TI “Real World” 6), then the proper conclusion is that there is no real causality 
to be known, only different ways of describing the necessity of events, none of 
which identify the “real” explanatory causal relationships. But instead, Nietzsche 
misleadingly concludes, “The ‘unfree will’ is mythology; in real life it is only a 
matter of strong and weak wills.” This is a truly puzzling claim, since it implies 
that the relation of strong to weak wills is a real causal connection of the kind 
he has declared fictional. However, that cannot be his view. For if it were, he 
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would be contradicting every other claim in the passage: there would, in fact, be 
causes and effects “in the ‘in-itself’”; it would not, after all, be true that “there 
the ‘effect’ does not follow ‘from the cause,’ there no ‘law’ governs.”
Most importantly, it would not be true that there are neither free nor unfree 
wills. If “in real life” there were truly strong and weak wills—that is, wills whose 
strength does not depend on their relation to other wills as a relative, variable 
quality—then strong wills would be truly free, and weak wills would be truly 
unfree. For what might it mean to say that “in reality” there are only strong and 
weak wills, or that wills are in some sense “really” either strong or weak? A 
truly strong will is strong not merely in relation to a weaker will, but in some 
way intrinsically strong. If reality consists of strong and weak wills, a strong will 
must always be part of causal relations in which it is free, while a weak will must 
always be part of causal relations in which it is unfree. However, we can save 
the passage from self-contradiction by taking Nietzsche at his word: just as his 
explanation of necessity as the absence of causal laws is “mere interpretation,” 
his description of reality as consisting of strong and weak wills is one more 
“conventional fiction for the purpose of description and communication, not 
explanation,” and so it does not identify real causal agencies and relationships. 
Just as wills are not really free or unfree, they are not really strong or weak.
The merely “interpretative” status of strong and weak wills becomes more 
explicit in TI, where Nietzsche rejects freedom of the will not primarily because 
it requires the existence of freedom, but because it requires the existence of indi-
viduals: “One is necessary, one is a piece of fate, one belongs to the whole, one 
is in the whole [. . .] nothing exists apart from [es gibt Nichts ausser] the whole!” 
(TI “Errors” 8). In the “in itself,” there are no strong or weak wills, because there 
are no individual “wills” or individuals at all; there is only the whole.
In other words, Nietzsche rejects freedom not simply because he rejects free-
dom of “the will” understood as metaphysical agency, but because he rejects 
the existence of individual agencies altogether. Stronger and weaker wills are 
merely “pieces” of the fatality of the whole. Hence, no piece is truly stronger or 
freer than any other: both the strong will’s apparent freedom and the weak will’s 
apparent unfreedom are illusions produced by carving up events into relations of 
causal priority, into causes and effects, abstracting these fictional agencies from 
the continuous causal whole of which they are a part. Only in relation to each 
other can one agent appear causally more primary than another, one appearing 
as cause and another as effect. In reality, every individual is causally secondary, 
the effect of the whole.7
But what Nietzsche really thinks about causality is ultimately beside the point. 
In the end, this particular passage is not primarily about the “in itself” or reality 
at all. Nietzsche’s primary concern in the passage is not the reality of freedom, 
but its phenomenology: the qualitative feelings of agency, freedom, and strength: 
“It is almost always a symptom of what is lacking in a thinker when he senses 
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some compulsion, need, having-to-follow, pressure, unfreedom in every ‘causal 
connection’ and ‘psychological necessity.’ It is very telling to feel this way—the 
person betrays himself” (BGE 21, my emphasis).
The question of freedom has decisively shifted registers: Nietzsche is not ask-
ing whether there is freedom or agency, but what causes the feeling of agency, 
which human types feel free. He does not conclude that strong-willed individuals 
are truly free; instead, he draws a conclusion about our motivations in affirming 
or denying free will. The strong-willed show they are “vain” by refusing to give 
up the “right to their own merit,” while the weak-willed betray their longing “to 
shift the blame for themselves to something else” (BGE 21). The intended lesson 
is clearly not that either belief is true or false, but that each believes according 
to her interest. Strong and weak wills are not free and unfree wills, but ways of 
experiencing willing—interpretations and descriptions of qualitative feelings, 
not their explanation.
What is most striking about the passage is that it underlines Nietzsche’s 
ultimate indifference to the debate over whether agents are really free and his 
overriding interest in the feeling, experience, and interpretation of freedom. 
This indifference is due not to openness on the question, but to his resolute 
denial that there is any such question: in the “in-itself” there is neither freedom 
nor unfreedom; the language of freedom is meaningful only on the phenomeno-
logical level. Let us call this the importance of the illusion of freedom thesis: 
Nietzsche accepts no morally significant sense of freedom, agency, or selfhood 
except the qualitative feelings that give rise to the belief in freedom, agency, and 
selfhood, yet he still places great importance on whether and how we experi-
ence such qualitative feelings. As we will see, every major account of freedom 
in Nietzsche’s works will hold strictly to a phenomenological description of 
the qualitative experience of an illusory freedom. Consequently, if Nietzsche’s 
moral ideal of human enhancement includes a conception of freedom, it is a 
purely phenomenological one: the heightening of the feelings of freedom and 
agency. Higher individuals do not possess greater freedom, but they do experi-
ence themselves as more free than others.
The Sovereign Individual’s Right to Make Promises as 
Prediction, Not Agency
If evidence for the compatibilist reading is to be found anywhere, it must 
surely be in the account of the “sovereign individual” in GM.8 However, even 
here, Nietzsche restricts his claims about the sovereign individual to phe-
nomenological claims about how such individuals experience their choices 
and actions. He does not assert that there is a substantial ground for their 
feelings of agency, and he repeatedly emphasizes the determination of their 
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actions and character by social training and drives in a way that undercuts 
the  possibility of authentic agency.
The sovereign individual is the product of the internalization of conventional 
morality or the “morality of mores [Sittlichkeit der Sitte]” (GM II:2). From 
the beginning, Nietzsche stacks the deck against the compatibilist reading: the 
higher type is not an agent but an outcome, not self-created but the product of the 
agency of society, not the possessor of a distinctly human form of selfhood, but 
merely a type of “animal” developed through a process of “breeding” (GM II:1).9
The principle criterion of “sovereign individuality” is the modest ability and 
“right” or “permission” to make promises.10 This ability, in turn, depends on 
what Nietzsche describes as “the will’s memory”: “an active desire not to let go, a 
desire to keep on desiring what has been, on some occasion, desired” (GM II:1). 
We are entitled to make promises provided we can be relied upon to fulfill them, 
and we can fulfill them only by continually desiring the promised action despite 
intervening obstacles and contravening desires—by having a “strong will” in 
the sense of a desire stronger than competing desires. Again, Nietzsche resists 
a strong conception of agency, rooting the sovereign individual’s independence 
from society in its determination by and subordination to its desires.
The compatibilist will likely argue that an “active desire not to let go” of the 
desire that motivated the promise is a form of higher agency: by preserving a 
desire that would have otherwise been modified by new incentives, the fulfilled 
promise is properly caused by the individual, not by her desires or environment. 
And so the promise is properly an action, the work of a true agent. Desire does not 
cause it, since the will to keep the promise is an “active desire,” an intentional, 
higher-order desire made by the agent against her own lower-order desires. Nor 
is it environmentally determined, since the promise is fulfilled against circum-
stantial disincentives.11
However, this cannot be Nietzsche’s view, since it does not resolve the central 
paradox in his account of the sovereign individual’s origin: how does a process 
that makes humans “calculable [berechenbar], regular, necessary” (GM II:1) and 
“like among like [gleich unter Gleichen]” produce as its “ripest fruit” the exact 
opposite—an individual “autonomous and supramoral [übersittliche]” who is 
“like only to himself ”? (GM II:2). How can a breeding process that transforms 
animals into “calculable, regular, necessary” machines (in other words, that 
moves us to a state even further away from “freedom” as we ordinarily under-
stand it!) culminate in a distinctively human kind of agency?
My own solution is simple: it cannot; it only appears to do so. Sovereign 
individuals are not in any way freer than the animals they are bred from—indeed, 
in all practical respects, they are less free. They are distinctive only because 
they feel more unique, autonomous, and independent of morality and fate. They 
simply experience the illusion of freedom to a higher degree, differing from 
others in the intensity of that feeling, not in kind. This interpretation makes 
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the best sense of Nietzsche’s claim that the ability to keep promises requires 
making people “calculable” or predictable (berechenbar), which is possible 
only by making their actions “necessary” (notwending) and “regular” or rule-
moderated (regelmäßig). The morality of mores makes behavior necessary by 
training individuals to internalize rules through incentives and disincentives of 
praise, blame, punishment, and reward. It makes them not simply obey a rule, but 
also desire the rule—“desire not to let go” of the original, externally motivated 
desire to obey (GM II:1).
But this is precisely no longer strictly to obey but to be constituted by a 
rule, to fully incorporate it into the hierarchy or social structure of drives that 
constitutes one’s character. The training succeeds precisely to the degree that 
the aim of the rule is now one’s own internalized desire rather than an order 
imposed from without. Consequently, sovereign individuals really are “like 
only to” themselves, “autonomous and supramoral.” They are self-legislating, 
because they are constituted by the law rather than acting in subordination to it, 
determined by their own desires rather than subservient to external norms—just 
as a robot in fact obeys its programming, not its programmer. (In this respect, 
the sovereign individual might be seen not only as a parody of Kant’s moral 
philosophy, but as a parody of Kant’s personality—of compulsive regularity 
parading itself as autonomy.) Most importantly, the internalization of morality 
also makes individuals’ actions “necessary.” For the conformity of their actions 
to the rule no longer depends on the contingencies of punishment or reward. And, 
as necessary, their behavior becomes predictable: individuals are conditioned 
to desire to act consistently, allowing anyone to predict accurately what they 
will and will not do.
Consequently, the internalization of morality also allows individuals to predict 
their own behavior accurately, and this is the basis for the illusion of freedom 
of agency. Fulfilling promises becomes possible when the individual becomes 
calculable, regular, and necessary “even in his own self-image” (GM II:1, my 
emphasis). The right to make promises is the ability to accurately predict when 
we will fulfill our promises, and to refrain from promises that we can predict we 
will fail to fulfill.12 It is in this sense that a sovereign individual is “answerable 
for his own future.” Such individuals do not have a special kind of agency that, 
through higher-order, intentional effort, brings a promised future about. They 
have, instead, more certain foreknowledge of how they will act—regardless of 
what they promise, intend, or desire. Higher types differ not in greater control 
of their fate, but in greater foreknowledge of it.
Compatibilist interpreters will of course insist that Nietzsche’s positive use 
of the language of freedom and agency does not support this interpretation. 
Nietzsche explicitly and repeatedly claims, they will argue, that sovereign indi-
viduals possess greater control of their actions, not merely an ability to accu-
rately predict them. But this neglects the fact that Nietzsche describes sovereign 
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individuals phenomenologically; he describes their experiences and feelings 
from their own perspective, not his. He describes not how they are, but how they 
see themselves. The sovereign individual has a “power- and freedom-awareness 
[ein eigentliches Macht- und Freiheits-Bewusstsein]” and a “feeling of the com-
pletion of mankind [ein Vollendungs-Gefühl des Menschen überhaupt]” (GM 
II:2, my emphasis). The sovereign individual’s superiority is presented from his 
own point of view and as a question rather than an assertion: “How could he not 
know [wie sollte er es nicht wissen] of his superiority over those who are not 
permitted to make promises?”
Although Nietzsche says here that this individual believes in both moral 
desert (“how much trust, fear, and reverence [Ehrfurcht] he arouses—he 
‘merits’ all three”) and freedom (“the ‘free’ man, the possessor of an enduring, 
unbreakable will”; my emphasis), he immediately distances himself from both 
views by putting them in scare quotes. The implication is clear: the sovereign 
individual falsely believes in the metaphysical kind of freedom that Nietzsche 
rejects. The suggestion that this type has “mastery over himself [. . .] over 
circumstances, over nature and over all creatures with a less enduring and 
reliable will” is likewise presented as a question posed from the sovereign 
individual’s point of view, part of the same sentence that begins, “How could 
he not know [. . .]?”
Again and again, Nietzsche characterizes sovereign individuality not as a 
kind of agency but a kind of outlook, a set of attitudes and beliefs, a “proud” 
consciousness based on an inflated self-image rather than reality: “looking out 
upon others from himself [von sich aus nach den Andern hinblickend], he hon-
ors or despises”; he “knows he is strong enough [er sich stark genug Weiss]” to 
keep his promises (when, as we have seen, in reality he is merely predictable 
enough); he possesses a “proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of 
responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over himself 
and over fate [das Geschick]” (GM II:2, my emphasis). From this passage we 
can conclude only that it is characteristic of sovereign individuals to impute to 
themselves a distinctive form of agency; it is far from evident that Nietzsche 
shares their belief.
In fact, he has gone out of his way to present their self-image as exagger-
ated, deluded by metaphysical conceptions of free will (“the master of a free 
will,” “mastery over circumstances, over nature”) and moral responsibility (“he 
‘merits’ all three”). So, the principal texts usually marshaled as evidence do 
not support the compatibilist interpretation. Nietzsche’s discussions of free-
dom always remain on the phenomenological level of the feelings of agency, 
autonomy, and responsibility, indicating that higher individuals are not in fact 
freer than others. What truly distinguishes them from others is the intensity of 
their feeling of freedom.
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Self-Creation as Artifice: The Art of Appearing to 
Oneself as an Agent
It might be argued that even if the sovereign individual does not demonstrate 
true agency, Nietzsche commits himself to a compatibilist view of freedom 
elsewhere. What, after all, are we to make of Nietzsche’s frequent descriptions 
of higher types as creators and artists of the self, characterized by self-mastery, 
self-formation, and self-overcoming? Surely this suggests a degree of self- 
determination, a freedom of agency that distinguishes higher types.
On the contrary, Nietzsche’s tendency toward aestheticism—the artist as moral 
ideal and creativity as a primary value—supports my claim that for Nietzsche 
freedom is illusory, entirely reducible to feeling; for his sense of “art” in this 
context concerns the shaping of appearances rather than reality. Consider his 
claim that “one thing is needful—to ‘give style’ to one’s character” (GS 290).13 
From the first line, Nietzsche qualifies his language, indicating with scare quotes 
that we must be careful when we interpret the notion of “giving style.” If the 
compatibilist reading were correct, we might expect it to mean shaping one’s 
personality, giving it distinctiveness or beauty through the imposition of new 
form. This would tie creativity to agency: to make oneself distinctive requires 
self-determination, an independence from external influence and a strong, caus-
ally effective self.
However, it turns out that Nietzsche uses “giving style” in a more mundane 
sense: to superficially change an appearance, rather than substantially alter 
reality. True, he initially tempts us toward the strong agency reading, describ-
ing individuals who “survey [übersieht] all the strengths and weaknesses 
that their nature has to offer and then fit them into an artistic plan [einem 
künstlerischen Plane].” But rather than creating a new character, what the 
individual creates is a way of seeing, a “survey” or “overview” that artistically 
represents rather than practically transforms the given, in order to make it 
appear as though it had been created according to “a plan.” An “artistic plan” 
is needed precisely because one’s agency was not planned. To give style is 
merely to create a frame of interpretation through which everything “appears 
as art and reason and even the weaknesses enchant [entzückt] the eye” (my 
emphasis). Weaknesses are not removed but recontextualized; character is not 
redesigned but given place in a larger artistic design that gives weaknesses 
meaning and value, causing them to appear as strengths: “here the ugly that 
could not be removed is concealed; there it is reinterpreted into sublimity.” He 
adds, “Much that is vague and resisted shaping has been saved and employed 
for distant views,” again emphasizing that this is a question of appearance 
not reality, of producing the appearance of style after the fact, rather than 
freely imposing style.
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This, Nietzsche underlines, is the “great art” at issue: an art of “views,” of 
interpretation and seeing, not of creation. True, there are less superficial changes 
here and there, but only of degree, not kind: the original character remains. More 
importantly, Nietzsche presents these changes in the passive tense: “Here a great 
mass of second nature has been added [ist (. . .) hinzugetragen worden], there a 
piece of first nature has been worn away [abgetragen].” It is not the work of the 
individual but of “the force of a single taste that ruled and shaped everything,” 
an impersonal force, distinct from the conscious self that surveys its character 
as part of an artistic plan: “It will be the strong and domineering natures who 
experience their most exquisite pleasure under such coercion [Zwange], in such 
bondage and perfection [in einer solchen Gebundenheit und Vollendung] under 
their own law.”
Although it is one’s “own law,” the law of one’s deep character, the law of taste 
is experienced as coercion and bondage, an activity external to the individual 
that she experiences not as the artist but passively, as the stone does the sculp-
tor. Nietzsche even suggests that it is only the strong who experience taste in 
this passive, coerced and bound, way! “Strength,” then, indicates not the artist’s 
freedom to impose a new order on the self, but the strength to affirm changes 
that one passively undergoes, an internal law that is experienced as compul-
sion. One’s character shapes and develops itself independently of the choices 
or intentions of the conscious subject, but the strongest subjects consciously 
interpret this process as their own perfection, seeing in it a larger pattern and 
unity—a plan or “style.”
But, our compatibilist may now object, if we passively undergo change to our 
character, then who is the causal agent of that change? What is this “taste” that 
supposedly has the ability to act upon and transform our character independently 
of our conscious choices and will? Nietzsche is quite explicit on this point: 
the self is not an agent but an outcome, a “social structure” (Gesellschaftsbau) 
(BGE 19) produced by many drives, passions, or “under-souls”: “The will to 
overcome an affect is, in the end, itself only the will of another, or several other, 
affects” (BGE 117).
Against the compatibilist who treats higher-order, intentional desires as prop-
erly one’s own in contrast to passively possessed desires, Nietzsche denies that 
conscious or intentional desires play any causal role in the determination of 
choices: “It thinks: but to say the ‘it’ is just that famous old ‘I’—well that is just 
an assumption or opinion, to put it mildly” (BGE 17). The experience of agency 
is produced after the drives have already determined a choice; we identify after 
the fact with one drive over another, making agency an outcome rather than a 
cause: “‘Freedom of the will’—that is the word for the multi-faceted state of 
pleasure [Lust-Zustand] of one who commands and, at the same time, identifies 
himself with the accomplished act of willing [. . .]. L’effet c’est moi” (BGE 19, 
emphases added). Once again, we find that freedom is an art of interpretation 
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(“identifies”) rather than of creation, and a feeling (“a state of pleasure”) rather 
than a reality.
Admittedly, the individual “enjoys the triumph over resistances” and “thinks 
to himself that it was his will alone that truly overcame the resistance,” but, as 
in the passage on the sovereign individual, Nietzsche is describing the phenom-
enology of an illusion—of what the subject falsely believes, what he merely 
“thinks to himself.” On the contrary, for Nietzsche, conscious, intentional, or 
“second-order” desires are not more properly one’s own, nor are they any more 
free or effective: “The greatest part of conscious thought must still be attributed 
to instinctive activity [. . .] behind all logic and its seeming self-mastery of 
movement [Selbstherrlichkeit der Bewegung] stand valuations or, stated more 
clearly, physiological requirements for the preservation of a particular type of 
life” (BGE 3).
For Nietzsche, it is the drives that determine and produce the self, not the 
reverse. For example, he tells us that Wagner’s artistic development began “when 
his ruling passion became aware of itself and took his nature in its charge” (UM 
IV:2). It took charge over Wagner. This is, after all, how Nietzsche describes all 
artistic creation, as obedience not agency: “Every artist knows how far removed 
this feeling of letting go is from his ‘most natural’ state, the free ordering, placing, 
disposing and shaping in the moment of ‘inspiration’—he knows how strictly 
and subtly he obeys thousands of laws at this very moment” (BGE 188). He even 
describes his own work in this way:14
[C]onsciousness is a surface [. . .]. In the mean time, the organizing, 
governing ‘idea’ keeps growing deep inside,—it starts commanding [. . .] 
it slowly leads back from out of the side roads and wrong turns, it gets 
the individual qualities and virtues ready [. . .] it develops all the servile 
faculties before giving any clue as to the domineering task, the ‘goal,’ 
the ‘purpose,’ the ‘meaning.’” (EH “Clever” 9)
Just as it thinks, not I, it creates the self, not I: “One is merely incarnation, 
merely mouthpiece, merely a medium of overpowering forces. [. . .] You listen, 
you do not look for anything, you take, you do not ask who gives. [. . .] I never 
had any choice” (EH “Zarathustra” 3). For Nietzsche, the feeling of freedom 
paradoxically coincides with the disappearance of agency; freedom is felt pre-
cisely as necessity, a loss of individuality and its reduction to part of a greater 
causal whole: “All of this is involuntary to the highest degree, but takes place 
as if in a storm of feelings of freedom, of absoluteness, of power, of divinity” 
(EH “Zarathustra” 3).
So, the agent of self-creation is the drives, not the self, and self-creation is 
merely cosmetic, a matter of interpretation, style, and artifice. In any case, deep 
transformation is unnecessary, since the content of one’s character is not the 
issue at all: “whether the taste was good or bad means less than one may think; 
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it’s enough that it was one taste!” (GS 290) Moreover, this unity of taste is 
merely a means to a more important end: “For one thing is needful,” he repeats 
at the end of the passage (recasting, arguably retracting, the claim that “giving 
style” is the one thing needful), “namely, that a human being should attain to 
satisfaction with himself—be it through this or that poetry or art” (GS 290, my 
emphasis). Nietzsche’s highest value is not, then, creativity, self-determination, 
or true agency, but self-affirmation, even if achieved only through poetry and 
art—through the illusion of freedom.
Consider the case of Nietzsche’s comments on Goethe, which are often used 
to defend a compatibilist interpretation of freedom as authentic self-creation: 
“What he aspired to was totality [. . .] he disciplined himself to a whole, he  created 
himself” (TI “Expeditions” 49).15 This might lead us to think, as Christopher 
Janaway notes, that “he brought about, by will, a synthesis within himself ” and 
that this suggests authentic agency: “it would at least appear to be something 
one does, as an agent, some kind of action.”16 R. Lanier Anderson agrees, argu-
ing that for Nietzsche Goethe’s greatness lies not simply in the possession of a 
“greater integration among the drives and affects,” but in being the causal agent, 
the creator, of that integration: “what makes such unity count as one’s own is 
precisely it’s having been self-generated.”17
However, does this passage really tell us that Goethe’s greatness is self- 
generated? Nietzsche describes Goethe in the same passage as a “self-
overcoming on the part of that century” who “bore within him its strongest 
instincts”—as a social product, as an outcome rather than a cause (TI 
“Skirmishes” 49). And Goethe accomplishes this feat of supposed discipline 
and self-creation though the artifice of style-giving reinterpretation: “He 
said yes to everything which was related to him” and “conceived of a strong, 
highly cultured human being [. . .] who is strong enough for this freedom” 
(my emphasis). Janaway argues that Nietzsche’s choice of words is evidence 
of agency: “‘Saying Yes,’ ‘conceiving,’ and ‘allowing oneself ’ are agency 
words.”18 But this is a very attenuated, qualified kind of “agency.” As the 
passage emphasizes, Goethe’s creative act is interpretative, not transforma-
tive. He merely “aspired to” rather than achieved totality; he “strove against 
the separation of reason, sensuality, feeling, will,” precisely to the degree 
that he failed to unify them. In context, then, “saying yes” does not imply 
fully achieving yes. Rather, to say yes is to affirm oneself as given rather 
than to change oneself into something one can affirm. Merely “conceiving” 
of a stronger, freer type does not imply being or directly making oneself that 
type; it is a tacit admission of self-idealization and a failure to fully instantiate 
that ideal. As we saw in the discussion of “giving style,” the way one “says 
yes,” the way to “attain satisfaction with oneself,” is through the “poetry 
and art” of a way of seeing: interpreting what one has become (in contrast to 
what one has made oneself) under the “coercion” and “bondage” of a largely 
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unconscious “force of taste” as if it were part of an artistic plan—a plan that 
one fits to the facts too late for agency, after having undergone change.
Nietzsche does not, as Janaway claims, tell us “this whole exercise is . . . 
one of ‘freedom.’” On the contrary, he says that Goethe only “conceived” of a 
human being “who is strong enough for this freedom.” Goethe did not produce 
his character but accepted it, and not by becoming stronger, but by imagining 
himself so. Freedom was not “exercised” but was the object of this artistic 
exercise of imagination. Goethe transformed his character not in content but in 
form—in idea, meaning, and value—and, in so doing, affirmed the character to 
which he had been fated. Consequently, he affirmed precisely his lack of agency 
and freedom, for he “became free” not through agency but through the rejection 
of the illusion of agency: “A spirit thus emancipated stands in the midst of the 
universe with a joyful and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only what is indi-
vidual is reprehensible [verwerflich], that in the whole everything is redeemed 
[erlöst] and affirmed [bejaht].”19
Self-creation is not, then, the achievement of a higher form of agency, but 
rather the creative acceptance of one’s fundamental lack of agency.20 Nietzsche 
calls Goethe “a spirit that has become free [Ein solcher freigewordner Geist]” 
not, as the compatibilist claims,21 to emphasize his agency, but precisely to 
underscore that he has not made himself free, to underscore his lack of agency, 
the “innocence of becoming” that is affirmed when we “reject responsibility” 
and acknowledge what Nietzsche calls “what alone can our teaching be”: “That 
no one gives a human being his qualities, not God, not society, not his parents 
or ancestors, not he himself” (TI “Errors” 8).
Nietzsche’s higher individuals have “become free” precisely from the illusion 
of freedom, seeking only its “artifice” in order to affirm, to say “yes” to, their 
own character as a fundamentally unchangeable fate. Nietzsche tellingly names 
this fatalism “redemption” or “salvation” to contrast his notion of freedom— 
emancipation from the illusion of freedom—to that of the Christian moral tradition:
One is necessary, one is a piece of fate, one belongs to the whole, one 
is in the whole [. . .] nothing exists apart from the whole! That no one 
is any longer made responsible [verantwortlich], that the kind of being 
manifested cannot be traced back to a causa prima [. . .] this alone is the 
great emancipation [Befreiung]—thus alone is the innocence of becoming 
restored . . . in denying God, we deny responsibility: only by doing that 
do we redeem [erlösen] the world. (TI “Errors” 8)
Because his principle objection to Christianity is freedom, his alternative is 
amor fati: “the fight against [. . .] the doctrine of ‘free will’—the fight against 
Christianity is just one instance of this. [. . .] To accept yourself as a fate, to not 
want to be otherwise [nicht sich “anders” wollen]—in situations like, that is 
reason par excellence” (EH “Wise” 6).
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The Feeling of Freedom in Resistance and the Affirmation of 
Practical Unfreedom
Consequently, freedom is not a criterion in Nietzsche’s normative project of 
enhancing humanity through the promotion of higher types. Higher individuals 
are not higher in virtue of a distinct form of agency, self-mastery, or respon-
sibility. Instead, they are distinguished by having overcome two illusions: (1) 
the illusion of individuality, the belief that the self exists independently from 
the causal whole, and (2) the illusion of agency, belief in the ability of those 
individuals to change independently of that whole.
This suggests that in the late works Nietzsche’s normative ideal has moved 
substantially beyond the category of “the sovereign individual” found in GM. 
The sovereign type was characterized by confidence in its own agency; it was 
thoroughly mired in the illusion of freedom. The ripest fruit of the history of 
morality is, then, not the sovereign individual, but rather the fate-loving, yes-
saying individual.
Nevertheless, the fate-affirming higher type maintains an important continuity 
with the sovereign individual. For overcoming the belief in freedom “enhances” 
(erhöhen), makes humans “higher” (höher), by paradoxically heightening their 
capacity for the feeling of freedom. Higher individuals experience a higher feel-
ing of freedom, precisely because they have given up a belief that at odds with the 
basic conditions of freedom’s phenomenology. For the fundamental condition 
for the feeling of freedom is the experience of resistance: “‘Freedom of the will’ 
is essentiality the affect of superiority with respect to something that must obey 
[. . .] as the obedient one we are familiar with the feelings of compulsion, force, 
pressure, resistance, and motion that generally start right after the act of willing” 
(BGE 19). Experiencing resistance is, then, integral to any feeling of freedom.22 
That is why Nietzsche claims, “One would have to seek the highest type of free 
man where the greatest resistance is constantly being overcome: five steps from 
tyranny, near the threshold of the danger of servitude” (TI “Expeditions” 38). 
For we heighten the feeling of resistance only by risking unfreedom—indeed, 
by tolerating a degree of unfreedom, for without some practical unfreedom there 
can be no resistance.
Such a view is, of course, incomprehensible on the agency freedom reading. 
If freedom is measured by agency, by the degree to which actions are caused 
by oneself, then the closer one is to the “threshold of the danger of servitude,” 
the less free one must be. The belief in agency freedom thus implies that resis-
tance is a hindrance to freedom, a constraint upon independence and a threat to 
agency. Consequently, the belief in agency freedom motivates individuals to 
avoid resistance, to flee the very condition of the feeling of freedom. In contrast, 
because higher individuals affirm fate, they are free to seek out resistance, to 
find their happiness in obstacles to, rather than the achievement of, agency. 
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They risk practical freedom for the enhanced feeling of freedom found in worthy 
 opponents and challenges: “One way of measuring the strength of an attacker is 
by looking at the sort of opponents he needs; you can always tell when something 
is growing because it will go looking for powerful adversaries—or problems. 
[. . .] The task is not to conquer all obstacles in general but instead to conquer 
the ones where you can apply your whole strength, suppleness, and skill with 
weapons—to conquer opponents that are your equals” (EH “Wise” 7).
Because the feeling of freedom is determined not by the ability to overcome an 
obstacle, but by the worthiness of a challenge measured by its relative equality 
to us, Nietzsche identifies the “greatest freedom” with the “greatest resistance.” 
Consequently, we can conclude that higher individuals are not distinguished 
by greater agency, self-determination, or self-creation. Indeed, they will often 
be less free in practice, since they intentionally seek potentially insurmount-
able challenges. The highest types are those who, by giving up the pursuit of 
illusory agency, have become free for a higher art (and artifice) of freedom: the 
heightened intensity of power found in struggles with equal resistances, a state 
of fatality not agency, of feeling not freedom.
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notes
1. For examples of Nietzsche’s use of the language of enhancement or “heightening” 
(Erhöhung)—often as part of phrases such as “enhancement of human types [Erhöhung des Typus 
“Mensch”]” and “higher types [höherer Typus],” as in GS 377, BGE 62 and 257, and A 4 and 
57—see BGE 44, 225, 239, 257, 262; and A 4, 7, 43, 49.
2. When citing Nietzsche’s work, I have used the following translations, with occasional 
changes for clarity and accuracy: Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); The Gay Science, ed. Bernard 
Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Beyond 
Good and Evil, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. Keith-Ansell Pearson, 
trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, 
Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith 
Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-
Christ, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 2003).
3. In this respect, I depart from Brian Leiter, whose extensive—and to my mind decisive—
critique of the compatibilist interpretation of Nietzsche does not examine the positive role 
that the feeling of freedom plays in his ideal of higher types (Nietzsche on Morality [London: 
Routledge, 2002], 81–101). Although my principal aim is to make a case for this positive account 
of the feeling of freedom, along the way I will add new support for Leiter’s case against the 
compatibilists.
4. Ken Gemes, “Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individual,” in 
Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, ed. Ken Gemes and Simon May (Oxford: Oxford University 
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Press, 2009), 33–49. One might, of course, object that “agency free will” is not a “morally 
substantial conception of freedom” as I have defined it, but then the distinction of agency and 
deserts free will would be a trivial one. Other recent compatibilist readings include R. Lanier 
Anderson, “What Is a Nietzschean Self?,” and Christopher Janaway, “Nietzsche on Morality, 
Drives, and Human Greatness,” both in Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity, ed. Christopher 
Janaway and Simon Robertson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 202–35 and 183–201; 
Christopher Janaway, “Autonomy, Affect, and the Self in Nietzsche’s Project of Genealogy,” in 
Gemes and May, Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, 51–68; and Manuel Dries, “Freedom, 
Resistance, Agency,” and Paul Katsafanas, “Value, Affect, Drive,” both in Nietzsche on Mind and 
Nature, ed. Manuel Dries and P. J. E. Kail (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 142–62 and 
163–88.
5. Gemes, “Nietzsche on Free Will,” 44.
6. However, compatibilist interpreters often cite only his conclusion that we should reject 
“unfree will.” They rarely examine closely Nietzsche’s stated reason for that conclusion, the claim 
that “in the ‘in-itself’ there is nothing like ‘causal connection’ [. . .] there no law governs.” See, for 
example, Gemes, “Nietzsche on Free Will,” 41, and Dries, “Freedom, Resistance, Agency,” 144. 
Janaway’s discussion of the full argument is the exception, in “Autonomy, Affect, and the Self,” 63.
7. For this reason, we should doubt Leiter’s claim that Nietzsche’s fatalism is best 
characterized as “causal essentialism,” the view that any individual substance “has ‘essential’ 
properties that are causally primary with respect to the future history of that substance” (Nietzsche 
on Morality, 82–83). Nietzsche’s claim that “the fatality of his nature cannot be disentangled from 
the fatality of all that has been and will be” (TI “Errors” 8) emphasizes not solely the determining 
causal factors that are internal to individuals, but those both internal and external, with an 
emphasis on causal relationships that defy attribution to any individual at all: “no one gives a 
human being his qualities, not God, not society, not his parents or ancestors, not he himself.” No 
one person or thing determines the future history of a substance, precisely because it is the entire 
causal whole, not any part, that determines the history of every individual substance.
8. See, for example, Anderson, “What Is a Nietzschean Self?,” 230: “Here, clearly, 
individuality . . . is a rare and high achievement attained by a few. . . . Nietzsche tightly ties the 
normative conception of selfhood, or individuality, to the value of autonomy.” For other recent 
compatibilist interpretations of the sovereign individual, see also Gemes, “Nietzsche on Free 
Will,” and Janaway, “Autonomy, Affect, and the Self.” For an argument against the compatibilist 
reading, see Brian Leiter’s critical review of Christopher Janaway’s Beyond Selflessness: Reading 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy (https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23543-beyond-selflessness-reading-nietzsche-s- 
genealogy/). While I agree with Leiter that the passage on the sovereign individual does not 
commit Nietzsche to compatibilism, I disagree that it is “wholly ironic and mocking” since, as 
I will suggest, the sovereign individual’s intensified feeling of freedom, while illusory, is indeed 
characteristic of Nietzsche’s higher types.
9. Nietzsche says that the task is “to breed an animal with the prerogative to promise [Ein 
Thier heranzüchten, das versprechen darf].” Notice that he does not say that the sovereign 
individual is bred from an animal, making it clear that even at the end of this historical process, 
the sovereign individual remains an animal type.
10. There has been surprisingly little discussion of Nietzsche’s use of the verb dürfen in 
passages usually translated as a “right” or “prerogative” to make promises. Both translations 
misleadingly favor the compatibilist reading, suggesting a right that the sovereign individual is 
free to choose to exercise or not, in contrast to weaker individuals who, while they remain free to 
make and keep promises, are from a moral point of view unworthy of the right, since they often 
fail to keep them. The language of “permission,” in contrast, immediately raises the question: 
permitted by whom or what? On an incompatibilist reading, the answer is that the sovereign 
individual is permitted by fate to make and keep promises, permitted by the psychological 
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necessity of their hierarchically unified system of drives. Nietzsche’s choice of “permission” 
should perhaps be taken ironically, since we could equally aptly say that sovereign individuals are 
obliged by their very nature to make and keep promises.
11. For recent higher-order readings of Nietzsche on free agency, see Dries, “Freedom, 
Resistance, Agency”; Anderson, “What Is a Nietzschean Self?”; and Janaway, “Autonomy, 
Affect, and the Self.” Even if such readings were correct, they have the disadvantage of making 
Nietzsche’s accounts of agency and freedom entirely vulnerable to the usual objections to second-
order accounts of freedom, such as Galen Strawson’s objection that displacing the problem of 
freedom onto the level of second-order volitions leads to an infinite regress (“The Impossibility 
of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 75 [1994]: 5–24, 18). For a discussion of this and 
other objections to Frankfurt-style interpretations of Nietzschean agency, see Leiter, Nietzsche on 
Morality, 88–101.
12. This should not be mistaken for the view that the sovereign individual’s illusion of 
freedom is based not on deep character differences, but rather on a tendency to “play it safe” and 
not make promises she is unsure she can keep. (Compare Aaron Ridley’s qualified criticism of 
the view that “the sovereign individual is just very, very prudent”; “Nietzsche’s Intentions: What 
the Sovereign Individual Promises,” in Gemes and May, Nietzsche on Freedom, 181–95, 185.) 
The sovereign individual’s strength of character is what gives her the rare ability of making such 
predictions accurately. Because her character is strongly hierarchical in its priorities and ends, she 
is constitutionally better able to “play it safe” when promising, since she will more often be able to 
keep her promises. In contrast, weaker individuals do not possess a capability for prudence, since 
their behavior is not predictable enough to know which is the more prudent course.
13. Until otherwise noted in the text, citations are to GS 290.
14. For an exhaustive account of the fatalistic aspects of Nietzsche’s self-description in EH, 
see Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, 83–86.
15. For compatibilist interpretations of this passage, see Janaway, “Nietzsche on Morality, 
Drives, and Human Greatness,” 193: “Goethe’s wholeness is said to be something he wanted 
or willed (wollte) and something he did or made.” This reading neglects to address the central 
problem of any compatibilist reading of Nietzsche, namely, that whether the individual wants, 
or wills, or makes effort is not the question. Rather, the question is whether Nietzsche gives 
us any reason to believe that such second-order willing, the choice to “create” or re-create or 
shape oneself, is any more “free” than first-order desires and character traits. See also Gemes, 
“Nietzsche on Free Will,” 45; Anderson, “What Is a Nietzschean Self?,” 230; and Dries, 
“Freedom, Resistance, Agency,” 155.
16. Janaway, “Nietzsche on Morality, Drives, and Human Greatness,” 193. Although Janaway 
strikes a cautious note here, admitting that a great individual might be either a product of chance, 
whose “‘self-mastery’ occurred outside of his own conscious activity,” or a product of agency, 
attained “by action and hard work,” he ultimately favors the agency reading, suggesting that “our 
attitudes of self-affirmation or self-negation might in addition cause alteration to our drives and 
their relations to one another in such a way as to move them nearer to a state in which they satisfy 
the internal conditions for human greatness” (194–95). It is unclear, however, how this picture 
of agency as self-creation through self-affirmation escapes the problems of the Frankfurt-style 
interpretation of freedom, again just displacing the problem of freedom onto the level of the 
choice of affirming or negating.
17. Anderson, “What Is a Nietzschean Self?,” 231.
18. Janaway, “Nietzsche on Morality, Drives, and Human Greatness,” 193.
19. “Bejaht” can also be read as “yea-sayed.” We should note that in both fatalism and 
amor fati Nietzsche emphasizes the individual’s self-minimization rather than self-glorification. 
As Leiter rightly notes, EH demonstrates this twist perfectly, announcing itself as a self-
congratulatory lesson in how Nietzsche became so wise, so clever, such a good writer, and so 
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on, even though “there is nothing, in fact, self-congratulatory about the answer,” since the answer 
is “one becomes what one is necessarily” (Nietzsche on Morality, 84–86). Just as Nietzschean 
fatalism consists precisely in the recognition that “one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole” 
and that “nothing exists apart from the whole!” (TI “Errors” 8), so in amor fati this reduction of 
the individual to an aspect of the whole is the real objection of affirmation or love, the faith that 
“what is separate and individual may be rejected [verwerflich]” but “in the whole everything is 
redeemed.” In other words, in amor fati the primary object of affirmation is not oneself or one’s 
existence but the world as such, the causal whole. For this reason we should be wary of Sebastian 
Gardner’s claim that “Nietzsche’s ultimate philosophical purpose lies in forging individuals who 
set value on (affirm) themselves,” which he in turn takes as evidence that Nietzsche attributes 
“reality to the I” (“Nietzsche, the Self, and the Disunity of Philosophical Reason,” in Gemes and 
May, Nietzsche on Freedom, 1–31, 9).
20. Contrast Gemes’s view that Nietzsche’s account of Goethe demonstrates his “aim to 
replace a passive stance and engender a genuinely active creative engagement of the world” 
(“Nietzsche on Free Will,” 45). On the contrary, Goethe’s depicted attitude affirms a certain kind 
of passivity in the face of fate, since it sees past the illusion of “genuine” self-formation and 
reduces creativity to the art of giving style understood as interpretation, as seeing the fatality of 
one’s own character and existence in its relation to the whole. He “becomes what he is” in the 
same way Nietzsche does in EH: “I never had any choice” (EH “Zarathustra” 3). Contrast, too, 
Janaway: “One becomes free in accepting and affirming oneself in the whole, and rather than 
seeing the necessity or fatedness of one’s character as an inhibition or obstacle to action, one 
sees it as the condition of and opportunity for true self-expression” (“Autonomy, Affect, and the 
Self,” 62). Janaway describes the agent of such “true self-expression” as someone who “affirms 
and embraces him- or herself,” “values his or her actions because . . . they are in character,” and 
“welcomes the limitations” her character and circumstances place on action. But it is not clear 
why these mere attitudes should be called “free will . . . attained, or regained.” Nor is there any 
acknowledgment that Nietzsche’s view of the self as a social structure of drives implies that our 
attitudes are every bit as fated as our actions.
21. See Anderson, “What Is a Nietzschean Self?,” 230: “by creating himself, Goethe emerges 
from self-creation as ‘a spirit who has become free.’”
22. Dries has helpfully emphasized the importance of feeling in Nietzsche’s discussion of 
freedom, as well as its basis in relations of resistance: “The self-system feels free, feels itself 
an efficacious agent, when it is engaged in relationships with which it can cope” (“Freedom, 
Resistance, Agency,” 148). However, he ultimately favors a compatibilist reading according to 
which we not only pursue the feeling of freedom through efficacious action, but have the freedom 
to develop and improve that feeling through more efficacious strategies of willing (156–60). 
I argue, to the contrary, that Nietzsche’s account of freedom is entirely reducible to mere feeling.
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